




















































In the last several decades, we have wit-
nessed a growing citizens' disaffection 
with representative institutions in many 
liberal democracies. In response to the 
inability of political elites to cope with 
the declining political legitimacy and 
the erosion of democratic institutions, 
citizens and interest groups are increa-
singly asking for a greater direct say in 
democratic decision-making. Mecha-
nisms of direct democracy are having a 
significant impact on the representative 
institutions and organizations like go-
vernments, legislatures, constitutional 
courts, political parties, and interest 
groups (Mendelsohn and Parkin 2000). 
However, direct democracy should not 
DiREct DEmocRacy aND thE RisE 
of Political ENtREPRENEuRs: 
aN aNalysis of citizENs' 
iNitiativEs iN Post-2010 cRoatia
Dario Čepo
faculty of law  
university of zagreb
E-mail: dcepo@pravo.hr
Abstract the last decade saw a rise in the use of direct democracy in croatia. the 
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be considered an alternative to repre-
sentative democracy, but rather as an 
integrated part of the representative 
system of government (Budge 2000). 
On the other hand, critical voices raised 
against direct democracy, and especially 
citizen-initiated referendums, warn that 
they could be used as a tool for under-
mining stability of democratic instituti-
ons, promoting particular interests, and 
endangering minority rights and free-
doms, ending up with a "tyranny of the 
majority".
In this paper we explore what hap-
pened to parliamentary democracy in 
Croatia since 2010 and how citizen-ini-
tiated referendums have become power-
ful weapons in the hands of different 
social groups and other political actors 
in the last several years. Institutionalized 
in the form of representative parliamen-
tary democracy, Croatian political and 
party system has been relatively stable in 
comparison with some other post-com-
munist countries in Central and Eastern 
Europe. It has managed to resist vario-
us challenges coming from major radi-
cal forces in the political arena. These 
mechanisms of resistance and stability 
were especially pronounced in the early 
2000s, when the then center-left govern-
ment faced a strong right-wing challen-
ge in the form of mass protests organized 
by war veteran associations and strongly 
supported by the largest opposition par-
ty, Croatian Democratic Union (HDZ) 
(Dolenec 2017; Nikić Čakar 2019). 
These non-institutionalized and para- 
political organizations threatened to 
bring down the government and reverse 
the full-scale democratization process 
that started after the 2000 parliamentary 
and presidential elections, which had 
marked the end of a decade-long predo-
minant party rule by the HDZ. Howe-
ver, this long-lasting structural stability 
of political system most seriously came 
into question after the accession of Cro-
atia to the European Union which has, at 
least indirectly, triggered a proliferation 
of various citizens' initiatives that led to 
many destabilizing constitutional and 
political consequences.
Starting from this context, in this 
article we ask what happens with re-
presentative democracy when special 
interest groups and political entrepre-
neurs start using mechanisms of direct 
democracy to mobilize citizens for the-
ir own particular interests. In order to 
answer this question, we focus on the 
national level citizens' initiatives and 
referendums in Croatia in the period 
after 2010. We argue that the prolifera-
tion of referendum initiatives in Croatia 
did not occur because of genuinely gra-
ssroots preferences, reflecting citizens' 
opinions on different policy issues. It is, 
rather, the result of a growing political 
impact of various interest groups and 
political entrepreneurs, who use refe-
rendum procedures instrumentally in 
order to mobilize citizens' support for 
their particular interests.
Contrary to some theoretical proposi-
tions, we also argue that newly empowe-
red political entrepreneurs and interest 
groups significantly constrain political 
elites in the direct democracy process. 
They are taking over the control of the 
agenda-setting process by exerting pre-
ssure on the government to accommo-
date their preferences and political cla-
ims in the legislative process, even when 
the initiative does not succeed in mobi-
lizing citizens or in reaching a referen-
dum phase. This article also shows that 
some of these referendum initiatives 
were used (or were planned to be used) 
as a political tool against minorities and 
ended up in constitutionally imposing 
a tyranny of the majority. In an attempt 
to build our arguments, we are mostly 
relying on the qualitative analysis of the 
legal framework and the evidence from 




















































red by different actors in the 2010–2019 
period.
This article is organized in five se-
ctions. It begins with a conceptual and 
theoretical discussion on the tension 
between representative and direct de-
mocracy. The second section briefly 
describes the constitutional and legal 
framework for citizens' initiatives and 
referendums in Croatia. The third se-
ction provides the qualitative in-depth 
analysis of all referendums that were ini-
tiated after a turning point in 2010 when 
constitutional provisions on referen-
dums were significantly loosened. The 
final two sections include a comparative 
discussion and concluding remarks.
Theoretical framework: 
Direct versus representative 
democracy
Representative democracy feels un-
comfortable with the citizen-initiated 
referendums since they break the con-
ventional chain of delegation and acco-
untability which is inherent to modern 
democracies. In a representative demo-
cracy, citizens delegate the responsibili-
ty of determining policy and empower 
their representatives to make decisions 
on their behalf, while at the same time 
they hold them to account and act as 
the final principal in this chain (Strøm, 
Müller, and Bergman 2003). On the 
other hand, advocates of direct demo-
cracy see directly engaged citizens as a 
corrective to the shortcomings of liberal 
representative democracy (Matsusaka 
2005). According to them, representati-
ve democratic institutions fail to secure 
the fulfilment of popular will and to take 
into consideration public interest in the 
decision-making process. Furthermore, 
in the last two decades democratic insti-
tutions, and especially political parties, 
have been faced with the failure of politi-
cal legitimacy, followed by the discovery 
of general trends of 'parties in decline' 
and 'democracy in crises' (Schmitt and 
Holmberg 1998; Dalton and Wattenberg 
2000; Mair 2013). The solution to these 
problems is to "allow the direct expre-
ssion of the popular will by permitting 
citizens to vote to determine public po-
licy" (Haskell 2003: 3). So, by no means 
coincidentally, in the same period as de-
mocracy faced legitimacy crisis, we have 
witnessed the proliferation and the rise 
of referendum democracy and direct- 
democratic procedures all around the 
world (Pállinger et al. 2007; Ruth, Welp, 
and Whitehead 2017).
To show the values of direct demo-
cracy, its supporters argue "that it gives 
people the ability to enact reforms that 
representatives might be reluctant to 
consider" (Karp and Aimer 2002: 148). 
Starting from this perspective, we can 
argue that the referendum-based demo-
cracy not only gives people an oppor-
tunity to directly engage in the decisi-
on-making process and make final deci-
sions on all important policy issues, but 
also serves as an instrument of checks 
and balances with which citizens can 
constrain the power of executives and 
legislatures and hold them directly ac-
countable. Furthermore, proponents of 
referendum-based democracy also ar-
gue that direct democracy has positive 
effects on citizens' engagement in public 
affairs, making them much more politi-
cally active and giving them an opportu-
nity to feel satisfied with decisions they 
make by themselves (Bowler, Donovan, 
and Tolbert 1998). In that way direct 
democracy serves as a compensating 
mechanism for widespread mistrust in 
politics in general and political parties 
and other representative institutions in 
particular, which have started to lose 
their social ground and legitimacy. Ac-
cording to Karp and Aimer (2002), by 
enabling greater popular control of the 
policy agenda and outputs, referendums 

























When it comes to the reasons for the 
rise of direct democracy, Mendelsohn 
and Parkin (2000), while referring to 
other authors, put forward several argu-
ments, such as the end of the Cold War, 
the signing of the Maastricht Treaty, and 
the expansion of the European Union. 
In contrast to that, Craig et al. (2000) 
point out that two other arguments are 
a much better fit for explaining these 
changing voters' attitudes – cognitive 
mobilization and political disaffection. 
On the one hand, this line of reasoning 
points to the citizens who have become 
much more confident in their own abi-
lities to make decisions and more capa-
ble in dealing with complex social and 
political issues. On the other hand, the 
argument of political disaffection shows 
that the level of citizens' cognitive abi-
lities is very much the same as before, 
but the level of their confidence in the 
abilities of their elected representatives 
to make decisions has been reduced si-
gnificantly. In addition, Craig et al. point 
to a third argument, which proves to be 
very much plausible in times of growing 
populism in modern democracies, "in 
which special interest groups and poli-
tical entrepreneurs have discovered new 
means of political access and, accordin-
gly, have developed the tools and strate-
gies needed to bend the use of popular 
political action to their own narrow 
purposes" (Craig, Kreppel, and Kane 
2000: 26). According to this argument, 
it is not the citizens who are responsible 
for the rise of referendum democracy 
by asking for more direct involvement 
in decision-making, but political and 
social entrepreneurs who work within 
the context of general disaffection with 
democratic institutions and mobilize ci-
tizens for their own particular interests.
As proponents of direct democracy, 
Bowler and Donovan address the well-
known objection to the use of referen-
dums, namely the one that perceives re-
ferendum-based democracy as a threat 
to the interests of minorities, ending up 
in the tyranny of the majority. These cri-
tics go on to argue that in the process of 
direct democracy a majority has control 
over the drafting and the implementati-
on of law and majority is much more in-
tolerant than political elites, while elites 
have little or no influence in the proce-
ss controlled by the intolerant majority 
voters (Bowler and Donovan 2000; see 
also Marxer 2012). It goes even further 
by saying that interests of minority gro-
ups in a society are best advocated and 
protected in the arena of representati-
ve democratic institutions. Legislative 
decision-making is oriented towards 
consensus-building between political 
parties and other political actors, ser-
ving as a gate-keeper and protector of 
the legitimate minority interests (Karp 
and Aimer 2002). Contrary to these 
assumptions, Bowler and Donovan ar-
gue "that nearly all forms of direct de-
mocracy require legislative elites to draft 
policies" and contend "that this con-
strains the potential for directly abusive 
effects of referendums on minority ri-
ghts" (Bowler and Donovan 2000: 125). 
In their analysis of referendum practices 
in the USA and Switzerland, they conc-
lude that outcomes of direct democracy 
are not necessarily more anti-minority 
than those produced by legislatures. In 
addition, they show how political elites 
who control the legislative process also 
control the agenda-setting in direct de-
mocracy process. So, according to them, 
"elite intervention is key in determining 
outcomes in the actual practice of direct 
democracy. It is therefore misleading to 
worry about majority tyranny without 
considering the role of elites in fostering 
tolerance. Second, in taking the paradi-
gmatic case of the initiative process and 
minority rights – where elite influence is 
at its (relative) weakest – we show that 




















































lerant of minority rights" (Bowler and 
Donovan 2000: 127).
On the other hand, several empiri-
cal studies have put forward some very 
convincing evidence, which supports 
the critique of direct democracy based 
on the anti-minority argument. For 
example, in her study of referendums 
and initiatives at local and state levels 
in the USA, Gamble (1997) concluded 
that there is strong evidence to support 
the claim that majority strategically uses 
referendum initiatives to constrain mi-
nority's rights and to deprive certain 
social groups of their legitimate rights, 
leading to the general conclusion that 
the majority tyrannizes the minority. 
In their re-examination of the impact 
of direct democracy on minority rights, 
especially involving the rights of the gay 
and lesbian community, Haider-Marke 
et al. (2007) conclude that minorities 
are more likely to lose in the process 
when citizens directly decide on certain 
issues. Christmann and Danaci (2012) 
go even further in their analysis of the 
effects of referendum-based democracy 
on the rights of religious minorities in 
Switzerland. While measuring both di-
rect and indirect effects of direct decisi-
on-making, they conclude that all direct 
effects are negative, especially in the case 
of the Muslim minority. As for the indi-
rect effects, they report that parliaments 
are inclined to make laws much more 
restrictive towards the Muslim minority 
when faced with popular initiative.
The legal framework of direct 
democracy in Croatia
The 1990 Croatian Constitution set up 
the framework for practicing referen-
dum-based democracy in Croatia, but 
it enabled only facultative referendum 
on constitutional and legislative issues, 
initiated exclusively by the president 
or parliament (Rodin 2000). However, 
the legal framework had set a very high 
turnout threshold, indicating that an 
absolute majority of voters had to turn 
out to vote for a referendum to be suc-
cessful. It should therefore not come as 
a surprise that the referendum on Cro-
atian independence and sovereignty, 
which was organized in mid-1991, was 
the only referendum held under these 
provisions. Although it was non-bin-
ding in character, it propelled Croatian 
claims for independence from the Yugo-
slav federation and strongly legitimized 
the constitutional decision made by the 
Croatian Parliament to declare state in-
dependence.
Although over the next twenty years 
there were no national-level referen-
dums organized in Croatia, the con-
stitutional changes in 2000 broadened 
the scope of the referendum's practices 
by institutionalizing the form of citi-
zen-initiated referendum. The new con-
stitutional provision prescribed that ten 
percent of all voters in Croatia can ini-
tiate referendum on "all issues that may 
be put to a referendum by the Croatian 
Parliament or the President" (Podolnjak 
2015: 133). Whereas the high threshold 
for a referendum to be successful was 
not changed, it was virtually impossible 
for a citizens' initiative to set a particular 
issue on the referendum agenda without 
strong backing from one of the two lar-
gest parties.
However, it would be wrong to assu-
me that, because of these very restrictive 
provisions, there had been no attempts 
coming from particular social groups 
to initiate decision-making through re-
ferendum on certain issues in the last 
decade. In 2001 the war veteran associa-
tions collected more than 400,000 signa-
tures for a referendum petition, asking 
for more protection and an increase in 
their constitutional and social rights. 
Despite the strong pressure, the cen-
tre-left parliamentary majority rejected 

























and incomplete provisions of the Refe-
rendum Act. In mid-2010 trade unions 
collected more than 800,000 signatures, 
asking for a referendum directed against 
the government amendments to the La-
bour Law, which envisioned the redu-
ction and limitation of workers' rights. 
Confronted with strong pressure from 
the trade unions and general discontent, 
the centre-right government withdrew 
its proposal, and, in the end, the Con-
stitutional Court ruled that the referen-
dum initiative had lost its ground.
The turning point in the proliferation 
of citizens' initiatives in Croatia occu-
rred in 2010, when political elites from 
major parties reached a consensus on 
constitutional changes, aimed primari-
ly at securing Croatian membership in 
the European Union. Faced with dec-
lining support for Croatia's members-
hip in the EU, political elites agreed to 
loosen the constitutional provisions on 
referendums by eliminating the absolute 
majority turnout threshold. Instead of 
the requirement that an absolute majo-
rity of voters (50% plus one) need to 
turn out to vote for a referendum to be 
legally binding, the new constitutional 
provision states that a decision made on 
the referendum is binding only if it gets 
the majority of the votes cast. Podolnjak 
(2015: 134) argues that "the intention 
of the constitution makers was only to 
facilitate the decision on the future EU 
membership referendum, but the con-
sequences have been much larger. It is 
important to state that it is now much 
easier to reach any decision in a state 
referendum, even to amend the Consti-
tution itself, by a simple decision of the 
majority of the votes cast".
An analysis of citizens' 
initiatives in Croatia after 2010
The true nature of the impact that citi-
zens' initiatives could leave in the po-
litical system based on representative 
democracy was only realized after the 
constitutional changes of 2010 (Butko-
vić 2017). After the successful initiati-
ve to amend the Constitution with the 
heteronormative definition of marriage, 
which was put to the citizens on 1 De-
cember 2013 (and duly won), the flo-
odgates of citizens' initiatives seemed 
to have opened for good. Some of them 
were a continuation of the "In the Name 
of the Family" group work of mainstre-
aming their presence in the political life 
of Croatia, some were used by ideolo-
gical opponents of the then-centre-left 
government or para-NGO proxies of 
the then-opposition HDZ, while some 
other were a response of societal and 
interest groups and non-attached citi-
zens to the growing lack of trust in the 
political elites at all levels of the political 
systems. Hence, some were anti-mino-
rity, some were anti-government, while 
others were anti-establishment in natu-
re. A more in-depth look into each will 
show their similarities and differences, 
especially regarding the actor and their 
motivation.
The Marriage Initiative/Referendum
The first citizens' initiative after the con-
stitutional changes was also the most 
successful one in terms of its long-term 
consequences and its intention. The 
intent of the initiative was to constitu-
tionalize the institution of marriage as 
a union between a man and a woman. 
The organizer was an up to that point 
not widely known civil society organiza-
tion, "In the Name of the Family", and 
part of a much wider religious-political 
social movement (Petričušić, Čehulić, 
and Čepo 2017), that had been active in 
Croatia even before independence, but 
which had grown in strength in the last 
decade.
There was no direct policy change that 
legitimized the demands of the initiative. 




















































legislative proposals that would change 
the long-standing legal norm that limi-
ted the use of marriage to heterosexual 
couples. Nor were there any relevant calls 
by LGBTIQ* activists or any other civil 
society organization in that regard. The 
organizers of the initiative insisted that 
they were acting pre-emptively, as they 
wanted to stop the spread of policies to 
liberalize the institution of marriage that 
was coming from the West. The position 
of the Government, which at the time 
was led by Social Democrats (SDP), was 
ambivalent at best. The activities of the 
Government after the collection of si-
gnatures were all but non-existent. Seve-
ral civil- and LGBT-rights organizations 
argued in the Court that the referendum 
should not be allowed to go forward, but 
the Court upheld the referendum's place 
on the ballot.
The short-term success of the initiati-
ve was visible in the referendum being 
organized and in the organizers suc-
ceeding in changing the Constitution. 
In the end, only 37,68 percent of voters 
turned out, and the result confirmed 
many analysts' predictions: support for 
the referendum enshrining heterosexual 
marriage in the constitution won 65,87 
percent of the vote. Only citizens in two 
out of 20 Croatian counties voted aga-
inst the referendum, as did citizens in 
less than 50 out of more than 500 mu-
nicipalities. This was, also, the lowest 
turnout for a major election in over 20 
years of Croatian democracy.
The long-term influence of the initia-
tive was much more ambivalent. Altho-
ugh successful, this referendum did not 
work as a complete constraining force 
on the powers of the political elites. Al-
though it might have done so in the fu-
ture, the Government had no intention 
of changing marriage laws at that point 
in time. Nor was Parliament stopped in 
the wake of the referendum's success as 
the ruling majority promptly decided 
to introduce the life partnership bill, in 
which almost all the rights that married 
couples already enjoyed were enshrined 
for same-sex couples, except the right to 
adopt children (though if one partner 
had children, the other one would sti-
ll have the right to become their guar-
dian). One can argue this was a respon-
se to the actions of the "In the Name of 
the Family" organization, and a way for 
the political elite to take back the power 
it had lost through the referendum – a 
post hoc agenda-setting under changed 
circumstances.
The Cyrillic Use Initiative
In December 2013 the "Committee for 
the Defence of Croatian Vukovar", a gro-
up of predominantly war veterans' asso-
ciations, collected more than 600,000 
signatures demanding a referendum on 
changing the Constitutional Law on the 
Rights of National Minorities. The in-
tent was to curtail the rights of national/
ethnic minorities to use their language 
and script as an official language in tho-
se municipalities where they represent 
at least a third of the population, as it 
stood at that point. They proposed the 
threshold to be raised to fifty percent. 
As it focused on curtailing the rights a 
minority already held, specifically the 
Serb minority in the Croatian town of 
Vukovar, the initiative was obviously an-
ti-minority in nature.
The spark that legitimized the de-
mand of the initiative was the decisi-
on of the Government, after the 2011 
census showed that the Serb minority 
accounted for more than a third of the 
population in Vukovar, to respect the 
Constitutional Law on the Rights of 
Minorities and to start with the proce-
dure of introducing bilingual (Croatian 
and Serbian) and dual script (Latin and 
Cyrillic) names on government buildin-
gs. The referendum was a way for the 

























organizations, to constrain the Govern-
ment in its intent.
The centre-left government was stron-
gly opposed to any change in the consti-
tutional rights of minorities. The ruling 
majority in the Croatian Parliament did 
ask the Government to check the eligi-
bility of the initiative, with the Ministry 
of Administration deciding in July that 
the initiative had more signatures than 
the prescribed ten percent of total vo-
ting population. Parliament then asked 
the Constitutional Court to rule if the 
referendum question was constitutional. 
In August 2014 the Constitutional Co-
urt ruled the question unconstitutional, 
as it infringed on constitutionally gua-
ranteed minority (in this case national 
minority) rights and prohibited the re-
ferendum to proceed.
As the referendum did not take place, 
one cannot observe its direct nor indi-
rect effects, but the initiative alone had 
consequences, both in the short and in 
the long run. Although the referendum 
did not take place and the government 
did not change the legislation in line 
with the demands of the organizers, the 
situation on the ground points to a vi-
ctory for the organizers. As of 2019, the-
re has been no enforcement of the con-
stitutional right of the Serb minority to 
use their language and script. In additi-
on, the local government of Vukovar, led 
by the HDZ majority, and dominated by 
right-wing political forces, changed the 
municipal statutes, which previously en-
shrined bilingual rights of local popula-
tion, by abolishing it.
The so-called Cyrillic referendum – 
whose name stems from the fact that the 
initiative primarily focused on stopping 
the introduction of bilingual street and 
government building names in Vuko-
var, a town in Eastern Slavonia heavily 
destroyed and then occupied after a 
three-month siege – was used by repre-
sentatives of some veteran organizations 
(aligned with the HDZ, which at first 
supported, but then was against the re-
ferendum) to constrain the power of the 
political elite.
The initiative obviously went against 
the interest of minorities, specifically 
the Serbian national minority; hence, it 
had an anti-minority agenda. Moreover, 
although the Government had no way 
of stopping it, Parliament did, showing 
at least indirect control of the agen-
da-setting process by the political elites. 
Parliament ignored the question for as 
long as it could, using all resources at 
its disposal, but in the end resorted to 
the court to stop the unwanted policy. 
However, as there are no bilingual signs 
in Vukovar as of 2019, we can conclude 
that their agenda-setting powers have 
been stopped in their tracks concerning 
this particular issue.
The Outsourcing Initiative
The global financial crisis hit Croatia 
especially hard, with the GDP falling 
by more than six percent in both 2009 
and 2010. The government was trying to 
find ways to slash expenditures without 
introducing heavy austerity measures 
seen elsewhere in Europe. One of the 
proposals was to outsource all auxiliary 
positions in public companies and go-
vernment offices (janitors, maintenance, 
cleaning staff). Considering it a part of 
the neoliberal agenda of precarization of 
work, trade unions started an anti-out-
sourcing initiative, and by July 2014, 
gathered more than 600,000 signatures 
asking for the policy to be put to the re-
ferendum. They were confident the peo-
ple would vote against the deterioration 
of workers' rights and support a trade 
union-backed law that would ban out-
sourcing of all work in the public sector. 
Faced with strong opposition from trade 
unions, the centre-left government wit-




















































zers still pressed for the referendum to 
proceed unimpeded. Parliament went 
through the usual motions, asking the 
Government to check if the initiative 
fulfilled all the necessary criteria, after 
which it sent the question to the Con-
stitutional Court asking it to check the 
constitutionality of the initiative. Altho-
ugh confirming that the procedural pre-
conditions were met, the Constitutional 
Court ruled against the referendum, sta-
ting that on the substantive level it was 
unconstitutional (USUD 2015a).
The Outsourcing Initiative was an 
obvious case of interest groups (trade 
unions in this case), stopping a gover-
nment's right to initiate new legislative 
acts. In that regard, having in mind that 
the Government withdrew the bill befo-
re Parliament could debate and adopt it, 
the initiative was used to constrain the 
power of the political elite to govern as 
they saw fit. This can be viewed as a win 
for the organizers, despite their inability 
to get their own bill through to the re-
ferendum due to the Constitutional Co-
urt's ruling.
Similar to the previous initiative and 
the original one, animating more than 
600,000 people to give their time in or-
der to sign the initiative's request showed 
what great impact the initiative(s) had 
on the will of the people to exert their 
power in the political arena beyond the 
usual activities of voting and protesting. 
The number of signatures collected, if 
translated into a number of "votes" ga-
ined by a political actor, is a respectable 
force, with only the two major parties 
being able to gather as many (and then 
some) during general and presidential 
elections. But, as was the case with the 
Cyrillic Initiative, the outsourcing one 
also failed at the very last hurdle. The 
Constitutional Court declared it uncon-
stitutional, stopping the referendum in 
its tracks. Political elites, in that regard, 
controlled the agenda- setting but only 
post hoc and only by sacrificing their ri-
ght to a legislative initiative in the first 
place.
Because the referendum has not taken 
place, we cannot say what direct effects 
it would have produced. However, one 
of the main indirect effects is that the 
government has once again seen the po-
wer of trade unions, which can hamper 
any future action of the government to 
alter radically workers' right of public 
and state-employed workers. This was 
not the first time the government tried 
to change employment rules and the tra-
de unions threatened with a referendum 
if it came to that.
The Highway Monetization Initiative
The second in the tandem of the 2014 
initiatives that dealt with the actions of 
the Government trying to use (neo)li-
beral recipes to recover public finances, 
was the initiative to stop the monetiza-
tion of most of the Croatian highway 
system. The system was built predomi-
nantly with public money, raised by ta-
king loans from international financial 
institutions and markets. Due to high 
levels of corruption, graft, and nepo-
tism, the state company that managed 
highways was heavily indebted, with 
the state guaranteeing for all its liabili-
ties toward creditors. The Government 
decided not to privatize the highway 
system, but to "monetize" it, meaning to 
give it to a private investor under con-
cession. The toll-workers' unions (whi-
ch would be the hardest one hit, as they 
account for the majority of the system's 
expenses) collected more than 530,000 
signatures, signalling several things to 
the Government. First, that trade uni-
ons in state- or publicly-owned entities 
still matter (similar to the outsourcing 
initiative outcome), and second that the 
anti-neoliberal attitudes are particularly 


























The initiative, led by trade unions and 
some left-wing civil society organizati-
ons managed, in the end, to collect the 
necessary number of signatures, which 
was verified by the Ministry of Admi-
nistration at the request of Parliament. 
After the organizers insisted that the re-
ferendum go through, Parliament con-
sulted the Constitutional Court, which 
decided the same way as in the Outsour-
cing Initiative – the referendum initia-
tive was procedurally constitutional but 
failed on the substantive level (USUD 
2015b). Hence, no referendum occurred 
in that situation either.
Despite failing to reach the final goal, 
this initiative as well constrained the po-
wer of the political elites by forcing the 
Government to abandon the model of 
dealing with the debt of publicly owned 
highways management firm. Monetiza-
tion did not take place and in that regard 
the initiative was successful even witho-
ut the referendum. Nevertheless, the 
political elites continued to control the 
agenda-setting process partially: first, by 
Parliament's decision to ignore the calls 
for the referendum to proceed anyway; 
and second, by the Constitutional Co-
urt's rejection of the organizer's calls to 
stop the Government from doing any 
policy activities concerning monetiza-
tion before the referendum took place.
From the perspective of the short and 
long term effects of the initiative, altho-
ugh one could argue that none can be 
seen because the government chose to 
ignore the demands of the organizers to 
put the question to a referendum, any 
further backtracking of a government 
faced with the popular rejection policy 
proposals will invite future initiatives 
dealing with similar questions to look 
for solutions in the direct democracy 
toolbox. This further moves the power 
of agenda setting from the government 
towards social entrepreneurs, at least in 
the field of public enterprises and labour 
issues.
The Preferential Voting Initiative
The two anti-(neo)liberal initiatives 
were a short respite from yet another 
initiative organized by the "In the Name 
of the Family" organization, which tur-
ned into quite a social entrepreneur. 
This time, the conservative NGO asked 
for a referendum through which the ci-
tizens would be able to decide whether 
to change the electoral rules. They asked 
for the introduction of preferential vo-
ting, opening what until now had been 
closed party lists. In addition, they wan-
ted a reduction of the number of electo-
ral units, the lowering of the threshold 
from five to three percent, and a ban on 
pre-election coalitions.
Despite their success with the original 
initiative, and heavy media campaign, 
"In the Name of the Family" collected 
only 380,649 signatures. This was dee-
med insufficient by the Ministry of Ad-
ministration, as it came short of more 
than 400,000 signatures needed to sur-
pass the threshold of at least ten percent 
of all voters with permanent residency 
in Croatia. The organizers contended 
that they collected more than ten per-
cent of signatures of the voting popu-
lation living in Croatia. However, the 
Constitutional Court ruled that the or-
ganizers needed signatures of at least ten 
percent of population with permanent 
residency in Croatia and decided that 
at that moment, the number needed to 
be reached was a bit more than 408,000 
(USUD 2014). Hence, the organizers fa-
iled and the initiative did not proceed. 
The political elite in the end did not have 
to act in any significant manner in or-
der to maintain control of the process. 
The Ministry of Administration issued a 
statement saying the initiative failed to 
collect enough signatures in the allotted 




















































soning of the organizers on the interpre-
tation of the "ten percent of the voting 
population" rule.
This was the first initiative in the 
two-year period of intense signature 
collecting, which failed to surpass at 
least the first hurdle of getting enough 
support from the citizens. Although its 
main goal was to constrain the power of 
the political elite to reform electoral law, 
by enshrining certain elements of it in 
the Constitution, in the end the citizens 
showed a lack of interest in the highly 
specific, and quite complex question, 
allowing the political elite to continue 
determining the ways in which to modi-
fy electoral laws. With that in mind, the 
government did try to blunt the force 
of the initiative, by accepting that some 
changes were needed. Hence, they pro-
posed the introduction of preferential 
voting in general elections (after previo-
usly being introduced in the elections 
for the European Parliament), by giving 
one preferential vote to each citizen to 
elect a candidate from the list they deci-
ded to vote for.
Such a decision had many, both posi-
tive and negative effects, which can be 
viewed as a way in which the initiative, 
although failed, indirectly influenced 
the future process in that field. Looking 
at the positive effects, the citizens got 
more power to overru le the intentions 
of party leaders by voting for candida-
tes further down on the electoral list, 
possibly marginalized by their party lea-
dership. However, for now, the negative 
side effects outweigh the positive ones. 
Since the introduction of preferential 
voting, we have seen a dramatic drop 
in the number of women in Parliament. 
With the general elections of 2015, that 
number was around twenty percent, but 
after the general election of 2016, it fell 
to only fifteen percent. Preferential vo-
ting has also helped some radical candi-
dates, who might not have been elected 
if the lists had remained closed. Current 
(post-2016 elections) Parliament will 
see at least two and possibly more candi-
dates that espouse not only illiberal but 
also antidemocratic political attitudes, 
and that are supporting the governing 
majority. In that regard, even though the 
initiative failed, it managed to change 
the discourse on the electoral law, force 
some changes and get some of its pre-
ferred candidates elected to Parliament. 
A success in failure par excellence.
The People Decide Initiative
In May 2018, a citizens' initiative "The 
People Decide" wanted to put a question 
of a "just electoral system" to the refe-
rendum. They claimed that the current 
electoral law – proportional represen-
tation, with candidates elected from a 
closed list, with citizens having a single 
preferential vote whose power kicks in 
only after a candidate has received more 
than ten percent of votes of the entire list 
– does not allow for efficient represen-
tation of the interests of the people. For 
initiative organizers, all woes currently 
plaguing Croatian society could be lin-
ked to estranged elite not being bound 
by electoral results to the interests of 
the citizens they serve. The organizers 
were a usual mix of marginal right-wing 
and populist parties, conservative civil 
society organizations, and individuals, 
some of whom tried and failed to change 
the electoral rules through the previous 
Preferential Voting Initiative. The go-
vernment, which at the time was led by 
centre-right HDZ, was opposed to any 
changes in the electoral law, although 
they acknowledged the need to reform 
some parts of it.
The activities of the organizers after 
the collection of signatures brought into 
question the legitimacy of the initiative 
and the process as a whole. After the 
official period for signature collection 

























lists for several weeks, without officially 
announcing the number of collected si-
gnatures or the date when they would 
transfer the lists to Parliament for veri-
fication. They maintained that the law 
neither stipulated nor prescribed a de-
adline, so they were within their right to 
decide on their own. The critics accused 
them of covertly collecting more signa-
tures past the deadline, as they knew 
that the number they collected was in-
sufficient to trigger a referendum. The 
activities of the government after the 
collection of signatures reflected the 
latter opinion. Because there were suspi-
cions of foul play, the Ministry of Admi-
nistration took their time in verifying all 
the signatures. In the end, and after con-
tinued criticisms by the organizers that 
the Ministry was acting in bad faith, the 
final tally decision by the Ministry was 
that the initiative had not collected eno-
ugh signatures and that the referendum 
procedure would not continue. The or-
ganizers asked the Constitutional Court 
to intervene, because the Ministry did 
not allow them to observe the tallying, 
but were rebuffed as their complaint lac-
ked merit (USUD 2018a).
In the short run, hence, the initiative 
did not have any impact. It helped raise 
the profile of some political and societal 
actors a bit, but its demands were igno-
red by the Government. In the long run, 
the influence could be more visible and 
linked to further deterioration in the 
trust the citizens are showing towards 
the political system of Croatia.
The Truth about the Istanbul 
Convention Initiative
At the same time the People Decide 
Initiative was being organized, ano-
ther citizens' initiative organized by a 
coalition of conservative actors of a re-
ligious political social movement was 
gathering speed. The organizers of The 
Truth about the Istanbul Convention 
Initiative were insisting that the ratifica-
tion of the Istanbul Convention would 
introduce "gender ideology" in Croa-
tia, thus endangering traditional Croa-
tian values and undermining Croatian 
family amidst the demographic crisis 
sparked by lacklustre fertility rates and 
widespread emigration. The spark that 
legitimized the demand of the initiative 
was the intention of Parliament to ratify 
the international agreement on comba-
ting violence against women and girls 
and the government's support for it. The 
position of the HDZ Government was a 
strong opposition towards the initiative 
and insistence that the ratification does 
nothing more than what is already en-
shrined in the Croatian legal framework.
The activities of both the organizers 
and the Government after the collecti-
on of signatures mirrored those of the 
previous initiative. In the end, the Go-
vernment deemed that the initiative had 
not collected enough signatures and, 
therefore, stopped all further activities. 
The initiative organizers turned to the 
Constitutional Court claiming that the 
Government had acted in bad faith du-
ring the signature verification process 
by not allowing them to have observers 
overseeing the tallying process. As in the 
previous case, the Court rebuffed them 
(USUD 2018b).
Both short- and long-term influen-
ces of this initiative are the same as the 
previous one. There is a slight difference 
though. While the previous one had no 
success in transposing any of the de-
mands into constraining mechanisms 
for the government's decision-making 
powers, this one scored a symbolic vi-
ctory when the Government introdu-
ced the Interpretive Statement. It was 
a non-binding document focused on 
the Government's rejection of any acti-
vities linked to "gender ideology" that 
the Convention espouses (although the 




















































logy, as such ideology does not exist). 
In this way, the Government legitimized 
the organizers' claims that their intenti-
on was not to stifle women's rights, but 
to defend traditional values against ide-
ological warfare.
The 67 is Too Much Initiative
The spring of 2019 saw a rerun of 2010 
and 2014 government-vs-trade unions 
confrontation, this time around reforms 
in labour and pensions legislation. The 
coalition government led by HDZ pro-
posed a policy reform based on exten-
ding the working age to 67 (from 65 
where it currently stands) and on pena-
lizing all those planning to retire early. 
The organizers were trade unions, this 
time supported by leftist and liberal civil 
society organizations as external actors. 
The three trade unions that initiated the 
process already had experience with this 
kind of initiatives, since their three pre-
vious attempts (one in 2010 and two in 
2014) were successful in stopping the 
reform intentions of the governments 
that put them forward. The newest one 
succeeded in doing the same.
The initiative was ignited with the 
intention of the Government to change 
the minimum age for retirement and to 
slow down early retirement through in-
crease in penalization. The Government 
declined to negotiate with trade unions 
and ignored their protests and demands 
even after street demonstrations were 
organized. The position of the Gover-
nment was a strong opposition against 
the initiative and an insistence that the 
pensions system would not be able to 
bear the pressures of an aging populati-
on and that therefore reforms were nee-
ded. The minister responsible for labour 
and pension issues insisted that the re-
form was necessary to stop the collapse 
of the system but declined to include the 
reform of pensions acquired under pre-
ferential circumstances (predominantly 
those for politicians and war veterans) 
in the reform package.
The activities of the organizers after 
the collection of signatures ranged from 
insisting that the Government's pro-
posals were illegitimate because of the 
strong support the public showed for the 
initiative during the signature-collecting 
process to demanding the referendum 
take place even after the Government 
decided not to proceed with the reforms, 
similarly to the 2010 trade union's ini-
tiative. The activities of the Government 
after the collection of the signatures 
showed initial confusion, then acquies-
cence to the demands of the organizers. 
The Government not only stopped the 
reforms they insisted were necessary and 
unavoidable but they also accepted all of 
the demands the organizers set forward 
despite earlier public statements that 
organizers' demands would cause the 
system to collapse even sooner. The em-
battled minister was replaced in a gover-
nment reshuffle a couple of weeks later 
and the new minister assured the public 
that he would work with the organizers 
on finding the common grounds.
The most visible short-term succe-
ss of the initiative was to stop the re-
forms that would unduly burden certa-
in segments of the working population 
and would discriminate against older 
workers. Furthermore, by showing the 
strength of 750,000 signatures that the 
public gave them, the trade unions for-
ced the Government to accept all the or-
ganizers' demands. The long-term suc-
cesses are even more pronounced, as the 
backtracking by this government made 
it the third that had to give up reforming 
labour legislation under severe pressure 
by interest groups. This, once again, 
shows how the agenda-setting powers 
of the government – be it centre-left or 
centre-right – have been severely curta-



























In this section, we focus on the compa-
rative analysis of outlined cases and on 
answering the research questions set in 
the introductory section. The analysis 
focuses on the profiling of political and 
social actors who used the citizens' ini-
tiative as well as on finding out the mo-
tivation behind their intent on using the 
mechanisms of referendum democracy. 
It also gauges the effect of the initiative 
at the level of citizens' engagement, as 
well as its success in constraining and 
controlling the agenda-setting power by 
the executive/elite, before (ante hoc) and 
after (post hoc) the initiation of the refe-
rendum process (see Table 1).
Taking into account the actors, i.e. 
who used the initiatives and against 
whom they were organized, our analysis 
has shown varied results, which could 
be boiled down to – mainstream, esta-
blished interest groups (trade unions) 
and new powerful right-wing actors 
(war veterans' organizations and reli-
gious political social movement). The 
trade unions and conservative civil so-
ciety organizations were successful users 
of citizens' initiatives because they have 
sufficient financial and organizational 
capacities to deal with complex intrica-
cies of the entire process. They can also 
mobilize a critical part of the public ei-
ther on their own (trade unions can get 
workers on the streets and can count on 
them to support their activities) or thro-
ugh powerful proxies (conservative civil 
society organizations and war veterans' 
groups could count on the support of 
the Catholic Church and even on HDZ 
at times). Other actors lacked such a de-
veloped network of support in finances 
and personnel and were less likely to en-
gage in signing citizens' initiatives or re-
ferendums, except as "junior partners". 
Therefore, except as marginal actors su-
pporting one of the organizers, there are 
no relevant political parties as instiga-
tors, nor have we seen a rise in genuine 
ad hoc grassroots citizens' network bu-
ilt around a common idea they want to 
put on a ballot. The Government's role 
in using referendums as a legitimizing 
tool for their preferred policies was also 
missing.
The motives of the actors could be 
explained as maintaining anti-minori-
ty, anti-government or anti-establish-
ment agendas. Although at first it might 
seem as if the intent of the political and 
social entrepreneurs in using initiatives 
was aimed at minorities, with the first 
two post-2010 initiatives being organi-
zed against the rights of the LGBTIQ* 
and the Serb minority, respectively, the 
analysis of the entire set of initiatives 
showed that minorities were only used 
to legitimize the actors and their use of 
the tools of direct democracy in the eyes 
of the citizens. To put it bluntly, the or-
ganizers needed an easy target, a societal 
group weak and ostracized enough that 
their intention to curtail the rights of 
that group would fall on the fertile gro-
und among Croatian population. The 
LGBTIQ* and the Serb minority groups 
were therefore used as the most obvious 
targets. Once the anti-minority agenda 
introduced the direct democracy tool-
box as a valid and easy way for citizens 
and interest groups to curtail the acti-
vities of the government, they evolved 
into mechanisms for the promotion of 
an anti-government agenda. This was 
the dominant motivation of the majority 
of citizens' initiatives analysed here. In 
the age of populist revival and the return 
of the demagogues, it did not take long 
for this mechanism to commence with 
full-scale anti-establishment narrative. 
However, these types of initiatives were 
rare, with a narrow focus on electoral 
rules and usually less successful. In fact, 
if we analyse them by the level of succe-
ss, those initiatives that were motivated 




















































highest rate of success. Also successful, 
but to a lesser scale, were initiatives with 
an anti-minority agenda, while those led 
by the anti-establishment agenda were 
the least successful.
From the point of view of the intent 
and the opportunity of the initiative or-
ganizers to constrain the power of the 
executive/elite, the initiatives had a mi-
xed success. Concerning the intent, all 
of the initiatives wanted to constraint 
the power of the executive/elite in one 
way or another. They tried to do it pro 
futuro, as in the case of the Marriage Ini-
tiative, which was aimed at stopping any 
future government's attempts at liberali-
zing marriage legislation. They also tried 
to do it by enshrining the status quo, as 
in the case of all trade union-led initia-
tives, which were focused on stopping 
the executive's attempts to introduce 
(neo)liberal economic reforms. Some 
initiatives were aimed at constraining 
the power of the executive/elite by for-
cing it to renege on either domestic or 
international obligations, as was the case 
of Cyrillic Use and The Truth about the 
Istanbul Convention initiatives. In the 
end some of the initiatives, and the le-
ast successful ones at that, also intended 
to constrain the power of the executive/
elite by changing the rules under which 
Table 1. Overview of citizens' initiatives in Croatia 2011–2019.



































































no small anti-establi-shment diminished PARTIAL
The 67 is Too 
Much Initia-
tive


























the executive constitutes itself, i.e. the 
structural elements that define who gets 
to be a part of the elite. These were the 
initiatives that focused on electoral re-
forms.
When our focus moves from the 
intention of constraint to the actual 
opportunity or the level of success the 
initiatives had in constraining the po-
wer of the executive/elite, the results our 
analysis offered were mixed. All initia-
tives could be grouped in two separate 
camps. With the exception of the Pre-
ferential Voting Initiative, which was 
partially successful in constraining the 
power of the executive/elite by making 
it to conditionally accept one of the-
ir demands – a single preferential vote 
despite the failure to collect enough si-
gnatures – the rest of the initiatives are 
divided into successful and unsuccess-
ful camps. In the successful camp were 
all three of the trade unions initiatives 
and the Marriage Initiative. They ma-
naged to force the executive either to 
maintain the status quo (in the case of 
three trade union initiatives) or to make 
it harder for future governments to act 
without constraint concerning marriage 
legislation. The unsuccessful camp gat-
hers three initiatives that either failed 
to obtain enough signatures to proceed 
further or were stopped by the Consti-
tutional Court. Although some of them 
were successful in the long run (e.g. as 
of 2019 there are still no bilingual signs 
in Vukovar), none of them constrained 
the power of the executive/elite in such 
a way that would allow us to pronoun-
ce them even partially successful. The 
government, the public at large, and 
other political and social entrepreneurs 
mostly ignored their demands.
Taking into account the effect of the 
initiative on citizens' engagement, we 
assessed that it was ranging from little 
to, at best, medium effect. Thus, the en-
tire revival of direct democracy had not 
made citizens more politically active. 
Besides getting the citizens to sign some 
initiatives' requests for a referendum, no 
other examples of citizens' engagement 
have been observed. The only successful 
initiative that ended in a referendum saw 
the lowest turnout for a national-level 
vote since Croatia's independence. Ini-
tiatives that were ignored or stopped by 
the government could not count on citi-
zens to put further pressure on the elite 
through protests and civic disobedience 
(with a partial exception of the trade 
unions but only to a certain degree). 
Nor did the levels of political apathy 
and disinterest of citizens in the politi-
cal process drop in the last decade while 
different interest groups were using to-
ols of direct democracy. The initiatives 
did not yield the expected influence on 
citizens' engagement and participation 
because political entrepreneurs were not 
actually interested in engaging citizens 
profoundly, besides instrumentalizing 
them for their own particular interests.
When the control of agenda setting 
by political elites is taken into conside-
ration, the result was mixed once again 
but pointing towards a greater success 
of political and social entrepreneurs to 
wrest the monopoly over agenda-setting 
power from the government. Most of 
the societal actors organizing initiatives 
had at least partial success in hijacking 
the power of the political elite to set the 
agenda on their own, i.e. in most cases 
we saw that the government's monopo-
ly over agenda-setting had diminished. 
This occurred in all but two cases. Only 
after the Constitutional Court stopped 
the Cyrillic Use Initiative and the Mi-
nistry of Administration ruled that the 
People Decide Initiative did not gather 
enough signatures was the government 
able to reassert its control over the que-
stion of constitutional rights of the mi-
norities and electoral reform, respecti-




















































government have to cede some control 
over which questions to put on the agen-
da to other actors, but had in some cases 
completely lost the opportunity to set 
the agenda. An example of the latter is 
the Marriage Initiative, the only one that 
ended in a referendum. The referendum 
results meant that the executive could 
not ignore the demand of the organizers 
or stall the process of implementation of 
the decision. The constitutional changes 
citizens voted on and supported happe-
ned automatically after the end of the 
referendum process, according to cla-
rification by the Constitutional Court 
(USUD 2013). However, the Govern-
ment was free to use its agenda-setting 
powers by legislating policies that would 
have a similar effect but would not en-
croach on a policy that was decided at 
the ballot box. This was the case when 
the SDP-led Government introduced 
and adopted legislation on life partner-
ships for LGBTIQ* couples, giving sa-
me-sex couples almost all the rights that 
the heterosexual couples already had 
through the institution of marriage. This 
allowed the Government to maintain at 
least some, if diminished, control over 
an important policy area.
Finally, this calls for an overall as-
sessment of the initiatives taking into 
account all variables and based on the 
reasoning that an initiative is succe-
ssful when it puts a question to public 
vote through a referendum and when it 
changes a government's policy or sets its 
own agenda. When put this way, only 
the Marriage Initiative could be seen as 
a complete success, as it was the only one 
that actually resulted in a referendum. It 
constrained the power of the executive 
pro futuro, had a large effect on citizens' 
engagement, at least in the preliminary 
steps of signature collection if not du-
ring the actual referendum turnout, and 
despite its anti-minority motivation had 
an indirect consequence of diminishing 
the agenda-setting monopoly of the go-
vernment.
This does not mean that other initia-
tives, which did not culminate in a refe-
rendum, were unsuccessful. It is impor-
tant to bear in mind that the referendum 
is merely a tool an actor uses in order 
to stop, set, or change a policy agenda. 
The ultimate goal of initiative organizers 
is for their policies to become the law. If 
they are not able to do it, then the suc-
cess can be also gauged by how influen-
tial they were in obstructing, stopping, 
or modifying a government's or elite's 
preferred policy. With this in mind, 
we concluded that almost all initiatives 
were at least partially successful in the 
end. Almost all of them succeeded in 
either stopping the policy preferred by 
the government or influencing the esta-
blished elites into adopting some of the 
demands of the organizers. Of all eight 
initiatives, we deemed only one unsu-
ccessful. The People Decide Initiative 
neither gathered enough signatures, nor 
indirectly constrained the power and 
wrested control over the agenda-setting 
by making the executive adopt some of 
their demands.
Between the most successful one – the 
Marriage Initiative – and the unsucce-
ssful one – the People Decide Initiative 
– were all of the other initiatives whose 
level of success varied greatly but whi-
ch were at least partially successful in 
turning their demands into de facto if 
not de iure state policies. The Cyrillic 
Use Initiative organizers prevented the 
introduction of bilingual signs even if 
the Court stopped the referendum. No 
government since was interested in re-
visiting the issue, including those that 
had the Serb minority party as a part of 
the governing majority. Even the Truth 
about the Istanbul Convention Initia-
tive scored a symbolic win as the Go-
vernment introduced the Interpretive 

























Istanbul Convention Croatia does not 
accept any element of "gender ideology". 
Three trade union-led initiatives were 
partially successful as they forced the 
Government to retreat from its preferred 
policy positions and to abandon the re-
form agenda on labour rights, pensions, 
and public jobs reforms altogether, even 
when the Government ignored their in-
sistence on holding the referendums.
Conclusion
The first two decades of Croatia's inde-
pendence saw only sporadic use of refe-
rendum initiatives as a decision-making 
tool. For the better part, these were a tool 
used at municipal or county level, the 
only exemption being the 1991 plebisci-
te on the relations between Croatia and 
the Yugoslav Federation. A few citizens' 
initiatives that happened in that period 
came after the year 2000, as political and 
social entrepreneurs showed a growing 
interest to use the tools of direct demo-
cracy at their disposal. These initiatives 
also depict the governments' lack of in-
terest to accommodate the demands of 
those political and societal actors and 
their intent to keep their monopoly on 
agenda setting intact. As our analysis 
showed, this situation completely chan-
ged post-2010 and following the consti-
tutional changes introduced by the party 
consensus in order for the EU accession 
referendum to be successful.
Croatian democracy has changed pro-
foundly since 2000, while the political 
system has hardly changed at all. Small 
reforms that governments instigated 
independently, or as a reaction to other 
actors' pressure (e.g. introducing pre-
ferential voting, abolishing the turnout 
threshold for referendums, etc) nonet-
heless brought about great changes in 
the trajectory of Croatian democratic 
development. One major reason for this 
lies in two different, but interlocking cir-
cumstances. The first one is the growing 
lack of citizens' trust in the political eli-
te, the media and other societal actors, 
including the European Union. This was 
then partially used by the political and 
social actors, who instrumentalized citi-
zens' disaffection with the elite, in order 
to further their particular interests.
The second one is the emergence of 
political and social entrepreneurs, both 
well established and new, who filled the 
ever-increasing void between the citi-
zens and their elected representatives. 
"In the Name of the Family" as the ori-
ginal, and the most powerful one, took 
advantage of constitutional and legal 
requirements, found an easy target in a 
marginalized group, raised its own pro-
file by railing against a question nobody 
even put forward, and, by tapping into 
the resentment of the populace, won 
their battle. Hence, they showed the way 
for other interest groups and civil so-
ciety organizations to confront the go-
vernment on certain issues. All of them 
worked in a similar fashion. First, they 
would criticize the government's hand-
ling of a question of particular interest 
to them. Afterwards, they would start 
collecting signatures, usually by aligning 
themselves with some powerful state, 
para-state or societal actor (the opposi-
tion, war veterans, the Catholic Church, 
etc.), while also using the media to rally 
the people for their cause. Then, they 
would exert pressure on the government 
to verify as fast as possible the elements 
of the initiative (number and validity of 
signatures collected, the constitutionali-
ty of the referendum question, etc.).
The government's response, on the ot-
her hand, was different in almost every 
case. They would either ignore the de-
mand as long as possible or would quic-
kly proceed with signature verification. 
Parliament would ask the Constitutional 
Court to rule on the constitutionality of 
the referendum question in one case, 




















































Court would decide quickly on some 
points, but would deem itself unable to 
decide on others. However, in almost 
all cases, the Constitutional Court in its 
decisions showed an interest in suppor-
ting "growing limitations to the popular 
referendum institute" (Horvat Vuković 
2016: 833).
Although theory asserts that the po-
litical elite who controls the legislative 
agenda also controls the agenda-setting 
process in referendums, our cases there-
fore show a constant struggle of the po-
litical elite (the parliament and the go-
vernment) to maintain the control over 
the agenda-setting process. In most ca-
ses they were successful, usually due to 
the rulings of the Constitutional Court, 
but even in those examples when they 
were unsuccessful (like in the case of the 
Marriage Referendum), they mitigated 
that temporary loss of political control 
by putting proposals on the agenda that 
would limit the repercussions of the re-
ferendum decision, or would limit futu-
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Izravna demokracija i uspon političkih poduzetnika: 
analiza građanskih inicijativa u Hrvatskoj poslije 2010.
Sažetak u posljednjih deset godina učestala je uporaba instituta izravne demo-
kracije u hrvatskoj. Pretpostavlja se kako bi povećanje broja građanskih inicijativa i 
referenduma trebalo potaknuti značajnije aktiviranje politički pasivnog građanstva 
i ojačati njegovu ulogu kontrolora izvršne vlasti. Naše istraživanje, utemeljeno na 
kvalitativnoj analizi pravnog okvira koji uređuje pitanja referenduma i građanskih 
inicijativa u hrvatskoj i samih inicijativa nakon 2010, pokazalo je da nije tako. Poli-
tički i društveni poduzetnici – bilo da je riječ o etabliranim akterima, poput sindika-
ta, bilo o novim akterima, poput konzervativnih udruga civilnog društva – koristili 
su mehanizme izravne demokracije kako bi promicali partikularne interese uteme-
ljene na agendama usmjerenima protiv manjina, vlade i političkog establishmenta. 
ti su akteri uspjeli zauzdati moć vlade, odnosno političke elite ante hoc, i ograničiti 
njezin monopol u kontroli dnevnog reda post hoc. Postojećoj literaturi o tim tema-
ma ovaj rad pridonosi tako što pokazuje kako se zbog slabosti u pravnom normira-
nju građanske inicijative vlada, odnosno političke elite mogu natjerati da pristanu 
na uvjete inicijatora čak i onda kada je inicijativa neuspješna u svojemu izvornom 
naumu – održavanju referenduma o nekom pitanju.
Ključne riječi referendum, građanska inicijativa, postavljanje dnevnog reda, poli-
tički poduzetnici, hrvatska
